From June 22 to August 22, the project’s analysts are monitoring four Telegram channels from our sample (NIEZALEŻNY DZIENNIK POLITYCZNY, NEWSFRONT PL, POLSKA GRUPA INFORMACYJNA I UKŁAD WARSZAWSKI) and looking for signs of promotion of Polish politicians in them

Why are we doing this?
During our initial work on this project, we noticed that the authors of certain Telegram channels are promoting specific Polish politicians, thereby strengthening their position on the Polish political scene. This is particularly significant in the run-up to the country’s upcoming parliamentary elections, which will take place in 2027, and that is precisely why the rebroadcasting of these politicians’ statements (even if it is done without mentioning the politician’s name) or quoting them on these channels can be viewed as a form of Russian interference in Poland’s internal politics and an attempt to influence the future outcome of these elections.

What are we looking at?
We review every post on all these channels from the selected time period and analyze it in the context of the current political situation in Poland at the time of monitoring. For a politician to be included on the list on this page, a mention of their name on Telegram must take one of the following forms:

1. An exact match between a post on a Telegram channel and a post on the politician’s social media page (even without attribution).
2. A mention of the politician’s name or a quote from their statement in a positive context, without criticism of their words or with open support for their statement (in the case of individuals holding high political office — no fewer than three posts during the monitoring period).

IMPORTANT: As part of this analysis, we do not include posts that mention key figures in the current Polish political scene (in particular, President Karol Nawrocki and Prime Minister Donald Tusk), because the number of posts containing their names stems from the roles they hold in Polish politics. Furthermore, we do not include on the list political figures who once held political office but are currently not active in the political/electoral cycle (for example, Leszek Miller).

Why do we classify the channels in our sample as Russian channels with Polish-language content?
Although Telegram stands out from other messaging apps and platforms due to its high level of anonymity, which makes it significantly more difficult to identify the author, the content on these channels shows signs, if not of being created directly in Russia, then at least of Russia playing an active role in their creation. That is why we are focused on these particular channels amongst the whole Polish-language network of Telegram.

In this context, we are referring in particular to grammatical errors and linguistic expressions that are characteristic of the Russian language but not typical of Polish; the appearance of identical content on Russian propaganda channels and on their corresponding Polish-language Telegram channels (along with a translation into Polish); direct and uncritical quoting of mid- and lower-level Russian officials, which is characteristic mainly of Russian state media, etc.

Furthermore, as an additional verification step, we monitor not only the four Telegram channels from our sample but also a broader list of channels in various European languages whose content is pro-Russian, to confirm or refute the role of Polish-language channels in the pan-European network of Russian disinformation on Telegram. Consequently, another basis for classifying these four channels as Russian is the fact that they feature content that is also published on those channels, sometimes even simultaneously.

At the same time, we are also tracking the circulation of disinformation on the aforementioned Polish-language channels on Telegram and on Russian-language propaganda channels dedicated exclusively to Polish politics, noting the appearance of similar messages on them.

A more detailed overview of our approach to this issue will be available in the final project report, which will be published by August 10, 2026.

The initiative is supported by the Ludwika and Henryk Wujec Civic Fund.
The information and opinions presented here are solely those of the initiative's implementer.